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Plain Talk About Plea Bargaining
BY JUDGE HARRY A. ACKLEY
SUPERIOR COURT OF YOLO COUNTY
I. INTRODUCTION
For those who seek a "bottom line", this article contends that:
Plea bargaining between attorneys in a criminal case can never be
entirely eliminated by initiative, legislative fiat or court decision.'
Plea bargaining involving the court is an anathema. The courts
are not in a position to fully understand the true reasons for a
plea agreement, and should be removed entirely from the plea
bargaining process and returned to their proper role of disposition
once the accused has been found criminally responsible to society
by plea or by a finding of guilt.2 California Penal Code section
1. 'The criminal justice system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious
crimes through plea bargaining. Depending on the jurisdiction, as many as 99% of
all felony convictions are by plea. This nontrial procedure has become the ordi-
nary dispositive procedure of American law." Langbein, Torture and Plea Bar-
gaining, 46 Cm. L.R. 3, 9 (1978).
2. One author of an exhaustive study of the entire criminal case process in
Los Angeles concluded that "in theory, the courts determine the issue of guilt or
innocence first and then consider the issues involved in sentencing. But in prac-
.1192.5,3 mandating judicial involvement in the plea bargain pro-
cess, should be repealed at once.
Sacramento County Public Defender Kenneth Wells spoke an
unvarnished truth when he reminded a judicial gathering that
plea bargaining is an "is" and no legislature or judge can stop
such negotiations "in the trenches." 4 It is a fact of life between
adversaries in a criminal proceeding and should be recognized as
such. When the public believes the parties have engaged in im-
proper bargaining, its remedy lies at the ballot box when the dis-
trict attorney stands for re-election.
II. THE BIRTH OF PENAL CODE SECTION 1192.5
The district attorney has traditionally carried considerable
responsibilty in determining prosecutorial policy and in adminis-
tering it evenhandedly, consonant with both personal conscience
and professional responsibility. Historically the responsibility
upon the district attorney has been an "awesome" one.5 Today it
is not quite so "awesome." The legislature and the high courts
have interjected judicial sanction and involvement into the plea
bargaining process, 6 where it does not belong.
Before the enactment of Penal Code section 1192.5, the respon-.
sibility for both charge and settlement through plea bargaining
rested with the district attorney who knew the evidence, presum-
ably made a responsible judgment and rose or fell upon his deci-
sions before the electorate at election time. The prosecutorial
function was not blurred. The state's attorney was not shielded,
or hampered as some prosecutors urge, by the shift of accounta-
bility currently found under Penal Code section 1192.5.
tice it is clear that the process of determination of guilt is very much affected by
the substantive effects of conviction [as in a plea of guilty pursuant to a plea bar-
gain] .... [T]his reversal of the theoretical ordering of issues reflects the social
reality of the court" in which active negotiations often cause the dispositional is-
sue to be resolved prior to a finding of guilt. L. Mather, PLEA BARGAINING OR
TRA ,L? (1971), 141.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1981) for the text of the statute, see infra
note 7.
4. Address by Sacramento Public Defender Kenneth Wells to Cow Counties
Judges Conference, Timbercove Lodge, South Lake Tahoe, California (May 16,
1981).
5. See Ackley, The Awesome Responsibility, CAL. TRIAL LAw. A.J., Summer
1970, at 17.
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1981). See also People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d
595, 607, 477 P.2d 409, 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. 85, 392 (1970).
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Section 1192.5 calls for what is, in effect, a contract to be made
with a criminal defendant to be "approved by the court"7 and re-
quires such covenants be considered by the court even when the
bargain involves the area of probation or sentencing. The result is
that the court can be required to consider a sentencing limitation
as part of the bargaining process proposed by any criminal de-
fendant before it.8 Once approved of, the "bargain" must then
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 provides in full:
Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading charg-
ing a felony, other than a violation of subdivision (2) or (3) of Section 261,
Section 264.1, Section 268 by force, violence, duress, menace or threat of
great bodily harm, subdivision (b) of Section 288, Section 288(a) by force,
violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm or Section 289, the
plea may specify the punishment to the same extent as it may be specified
by the jury on a plea of not guilty or fixed by the court on a plea of guilty,
nolo contendere, or not guilty, and may specify the exercise by the court
thereafter of other powers legally available to it.
Where such plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court
and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as otherwise provided
in this section, cannot be sentenced on such plea to a punishment more
severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to
such plea other than as specified in the plea.
If the court approved of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to the
making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at the
time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncment
of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of
the matter, and (3) in such case, the defendant shall also cause an inquiry
to be made of the defendant to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for
such plea.
If such plea is not accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by
the court, the plea shall be by the court, the plea shall be deemed with-
drawn and the defendant may then enter such plea or pleas as would
otherwise have been available.
If such plea is withdrawn or deemed withdrawn, it may not be received in
evidence in any criminal, civil, or special action or proceeding of any na-
ture, including proceedings before agencies, commission, boards, and
tribunals.
8. In People v. Smith, 22 Cal. App. 3d 25, 99 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971), the accused
offered to plead guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property, specifying a pen-
alty of probation with restitution and one year in the county jail. Even though the
district attorney indicated his acceptance of the conditional plea, the trial court ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the process wherein it "looks to me like the possibil-
ity that the people who have violated the law are dictating the disposition of their
case rather than the Judge .... " Id. at 29, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 173. The appellate court
held that "[a]lthough it is within the discretion of the court to approve or reject
generally be strictly enforced under penalty of reversal.9
Debate over the proper court role in the plea bargaining process
has frequently produced disagreement. Proponents of greater
court involvement have traditionally asserted that the trouble
with plea bargaining was the court involvement in approving or
disapproving results of admittedly sub rosa negotiations toward
settlement and disposition.O Judicial approbation of such negoti-
ations, it was urged, would solve the problems otherwise present
in the system." In People v. West,12 the California Supreme
Court prescribed the need for judicial involvement in the plea
bargaining process. In West the court sitting en banc with no dis-
sent, found that:
the greatest danger in the current practice lies in its secretiveness ...
IT] he basis of the bargain should be disclosed to the court and incorpo-
rated in the record. We should exhume the process from stale obscurant-
ism and let the fresh light of open analysis expose both the prior
discussions and agreements of the parties, as well as the court's reasons
for its resolution of the matter.
13
People v. West was decided in 1970. That same year the Califor-
nia Legislature joined the race toward "the fresh light of open
analysis" by enacting Penal Code section 1192.5. The legislative
stamp of approval upon the process provided by section 1192.5 be-
stows upon a felony defendant the role of offeror and places the
trial court in the position of offeree. Section 1192.5 provides in
pertinent part:
Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an information or indictment,
the plea may specify the punishment to the same extent as it may be
specified by the jury on a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty, and
may specify the exercise by the court thereafter of other powers legally
available to it.14
the proffered offer, the court may not arbitrarily refuse to consider the offer." Id.
at 30, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
9. In re Troglin, 51 Cal. App. 3d 434, 438, 124 Cal. Rptr. 234, 237 (1975). The
Troglin court stated that "[wiell established is the rule that the People will be
held strictly to the terms of a plea bargain made with a criminally accused... it
seems reasonable and just, at least where no public policy, or statutory or deci-
sional or constitutional principal otherwise directs, that the accused also be held
to his agreement." Id. (Citations omitted.)
10. Bongiovanni, Guilty Plea Negotiation, 7 DuQ. L. REV. 542, 543, (1969)
(quoted in People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 609, 77 P.2d 406, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 383
(1970)).
11. Id.
12. 3 Cal. 3d at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393. The court in West de-
termined that the plea agreement should be fully discussed and reported in the
court record so that the term would be fully stated and understood by all parties.
This will not only serve to inform the public through the record of agreements be-
ing made but will also afford the appellate court a complete account of the pro-
ceeding if future review becomes necessary.
13. Id. at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1981).
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III. PLEA BARGAINING IN PRACTICE
Both Justice Trobriner's criticism of the plea bargain expressed
in West' 5 and the codification of the new system as expressed in
Penal Code section 1192.5 fail to consider realistically the condi-
tions of the criminal trial courts.' 6 Sit in any criminal court in the
state on any given day when a plea bargain is being sought and
try and find in the record of the proceedings "prior discussions
and agreements of the parties . . ." or the court's input on the
"reasons for its resolution of the matter... .17 No court has
time for such an exhaustive exploration because of the multiplic-
ity of plea bargained cases on the calendar before it daily. Nor
does any court have the ability to reach the true reasons for the
presented plea bargain or conditional plea as required under Pe-
nal Code section 1192.5.
What in fact happens in plea bargained felony cases is now a
litany. Any reporter's transcript will show the repetitive recitals
of entered plea bargains in various forms. A statement of plea
and disposition is entered, if part of the defendant's offer is made
by the district attorney through a bargain or conditional plea and
request for judicial approval on the court's morning Law and Mo-
tion Calendar or Trial Confirmation Calendar. The calendars are
generally scheduled during ongoing trials as time permits.18
Thereafter cursory approval or rejection of the bargain or condi-
tional plea follows. If the court approves the plea, the necessary
colloquy is put into the record. If the court has doubts multiple
weeks of delay ensue for probation officer reference and return
15. Justice Tobriner, writing for the unanimous court, suggested that plea dis-
agreements should be openly discussed with the court and put on record rather
than decided beforehand in lengthy negotiations between the defendant, his attor-
ney and the district attorney. People v. West, 3 Cal. 595, 609-610, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385,
394-95, 477 P.2d 49, 417-18 (1970).
16. See generally Report to the Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code,
127-38, Oct 31, 1980, for a factual study of court involvement in plea bargaining in
three California counties.
17. 3 Cal. 3d at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393. See also Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 62,71 (1977), quoted in People v. Gallego, 90 Cal. App. 3d 21, 28, 153
Cal. Rptr. 415, 499 (1979), wherein the court states: "Whatever might be the situa-
tion in an ideal world the fact is that the guilty'plea and the often concomitant
plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system.
Their chief advantages are... economy and finality."
18. This procedure is the most common arrangement, but some large counties
are often required to schedule several or an entire department just to handle the
law and motion tasks.
and ultimate acceptance or rejection. The fresh light of analysis, 19
open or otherwise, sought by Justice Tobriner in West is nowhere
present in the cursory proceeding.
Another phenomenon which stems from the required judicial
involvement, under our present system, of the dichotomy be-
tween the superior courts and the municipal courts is the follow-
ing legerdemain, which further blurs the responsibility and fur-
ther confounds the electorate as to who is really doing what in the
entire plea bargaining process. The bargained plea in a felony
case is often taken in the municipal court, which from a sentenc-
ing standpoint, has no jurisdiction over the plea.20 A plea so taken
is deemed entered for superior court purposes and need not be in-
troduced again in the upper court.21
One can see how the responsibility for a bad bargain is elusive
from the standpoint of accountability to the voting public. After
the plea has been entered the matter is referred to the superior
court for disposition through a sentence already approved by a
municipal court judge lacking jurisdiction to pronounce it.22 This
magic buck-passing, which refers cases to the superior court for
sentencing within boundaries approved by the municipal court in
first accepting the plea bargain, briskly clears the municipal court
calendar of scheduled preliminary examinations but is pernicious
in end result.
Too often the municipal court reasons that it should not reason
at all inasmuch as final acceptance of the bargain rests with the
superior court after approval by the lower court. Thus limitations
on disposition are approved by a municipal court judge who does
not bear the onus of carrying them out in close and difficult
cases.23 The dispositional issue is then presented at the superior
court level by astute counsel who unfailingly pronounce that
"Judge Wise approved it in the municipal court," the clear impli-
19. 3 Cal. 3d at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
20. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 10 gives original jurisdiction to superior courts in all
causes except those given by statute to other trial courts; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462
gives jurisdiction to the municipal court in misdemeanor criminal cases, where the
offense was committed within the county where the minicipal court is established.
Thus in California, superior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over felonies.
21. In People v. Toff, 48 Cal. App. 2d 360, 361, 119 P.2d 745, 748 (1941), the proce-
dure under CAL. PENAL CODE § 859(a), which placed a defendant who pleads in
the lower court in the same position as if he had entered his plea to the charge in
the superior court, was held not to violate either the state or federal constitution.
22. See supra note 20.
23. In most jurisdictions, arraignment and preliminary hearings can occur in
the municipal court before arraignment in the superior court. Too often cases are
"disposed of" in these initial proceedings without consideration of the formal dele-
gation of responsibility contained in California law. See L MATHER, Plea Bargain-
ing or Trial? (1979) 48-54.
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cation being that the superior court judge should not go against
his brother at the bench in the municipal court who originally
gave it his approval. 24
In practice, municipal court approval is without consideration of
a probation officer's report,25 which is usually first ordered at the
time of the negotiated plea in municipal court when the plea is ac-
cepted but which is actually used upon further consideration by
the superior court prior to disposition.26 Such a practice demon-
strates the lack of any considered or meaningful judicial involve-
ment at the time the municipal court accepts the bargain and
gives to it the requisite judicial approval before referring it to the
superior court for further proceedings.
The cutting edge of public accountability is further blunted by
the superior court rationale that the municipal court jurist care-
fully considered the problems with the case before approving the
plea bargain initially, and any approved negotiated agreement is
to be rejected by the superior court only in unusual circum-
stances. In sum, if there are repercussions from a bad plea bar-
gain the public can always be told that the responsibility lies at
the doorstep of another, be it the district attorney, the public de-
fender or other defense counsel, the municipal court judge, the
probation department, or the superior court judge depending
upon who is called upon to answer the "Letters To The Editor"
column or other public forum at the moment.
If the superior court refers the matter back to the municipal
24. See People v. Superior Court (Barke), 64 Cal. App. 3d 710, 134 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1976). Although the municipal court accepted the plea, the superior court be-
lieved that the defendant was not guilty based on the evidence and sent the plea
back with orders to withdraw it. The appellate court directed the original nolo
contendere plea to be reinstated and for further proceedings by the superior court.
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203 requires the acceptance of a plea or a conviction
prior to any investigation or report by the Probation Department. The Probation
report includes any relevant personal information of the defendant and past viola-
tions whether misdemeanors or felonies and is used to aid the superior court in its
proceedings and assessment of the sentence to be imposed. See also People v.
Lockwood, 253 Cal. App. 2d 75, 61 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1967). The court followed the rec-
ommendations of a probation report suggesting that because of defendant's past
conduct and involvement in drugs she should be refused probation and rehabilita-
tion and instead sentenced to prison.
26. For an argument in favor of increased usage of a pre-plea probation report,
see Levie, "A Viable Alternative to Plea Bargaining" L.A.B.J. 158 (October 1976).
Mr. Levie's basic arguments in favor of this procedure are that it allows a judge to
be better informed regarding an accused's circumstances and background, and
that disposition of a large number of cases would be facilitated, especially when
considering time and cost.
court level rejecting the plea bargain many things result from the
fiscal standpoint of the beleaguered taxpayer already properly
disenchanted with the entire "plea bargaining" fiasco. 27 Consider:
.(1) The cost of a now meaningless process of accepting a plea
in the lower court involving a knowing and intelligent waiver of
rights in presentation of the bargain and acceptance thereof in
terms of courtroom, judge, attorney, bailiff, clerk, sheriff, court re-
porter and possible unused witness time.
(2) The cost incured for probation office reference time to pro-
vide a written report to the superior court.
(3) The cost of courtroom, judge, attorney, bailiff, clerk, sheriff,
and court reporter time at the superior court level.
(4) Add the cost for jail housing if the defendant is in custody.
(5) Finally, consider the cost if the superior court judge who re-
jected the first plea and is later disqualified under Civil Procedure
Code section 170.6.28 If the municipal court accepts a slightly dif-
ferent plea bargain after reference back, that modified plea bar-
gain must again be considered by the superior court.29
It has been over ten years since the pronouncement of West
and the enactment of Penal Code section 1192.5 and the hoped-for
enlightened judicial participation in the plea bargaining process.
27. The case of People v. Superior Court (Barke) 64 Cal. App. 3d 710, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1976), is a classic case of superior court to municipal court ping pong
which wastes time and money. In that case, the municipal court accepted a plea
bargain which the superior court would not. Upon return of the case for a prelimi-
nary hearing, the municipal court refused to change the plea and recertified the
case to the superior court. The superior court again refused to accept the plea and
again returned the case to the municipal court. The municipal court finally
granted the motion to withdraw the plea, and set a preliminary hearing. The Peo-
ple then petitioned for and obtained a writ of mandate directing that the original
plea bargain be reinstated and that the case proceed to the superior court for the
third time on that plea.
28. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1982), this section, concerning
disqualification of judges, provides that the original superior court judge who re-
fused the first plea may be disqualified upon oral or written motion by the defend-
ant. The defendant must establish prejudice to his case and if the judge is
disqualified the matter will be assigned or transferred to another judge at the con-
venience of the court.
29. The challenge is timely if made after consideration of the plea bargain but
before the plea bargain is finally accepted. Lyons v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App.
3d 625, 628, 140 Cal. Rptr. 826, 828 (1977). See also Smith v. Contra Costa Mun.
Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 151, 153, 139 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122 (1977) (defendant's motion to
disqualify was untimely even though made prior to the probation report and sen-
tencing because it was made after the plea was accepted). Fraijo v. Superior
Court, 34 Cal. App. 3d 222, 225, 109 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1973). The challenge is un-
timely if made after the plea bargain has been accepted. People v. Barnfleld, 52
Cal. App. 3d 210, 215, 123 Cal. Rptr. 859, 861 (1975) (defendant's motion to disqual-
ify the judge in the probation revocation hearing was untimely because the revo-
cation hearing was merely an extension of the original probation imposition under
the plea agreement).
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Where are the courts and the public they serve in the present
quagmire of mandated judicial participation? On a day-to-day ba-
sis the judge handling the criminal docket is directly faced with a
plethora of "I'll tell you what I'm gonna do" offers from criminal
defendants, supposedly offers the court cannot refuse.30 A few
examples:
(1) I'll plead if the court will agree with the district attorney's
abandonment of his right to argue for a state prison commitment
or other disposition.3 1
(2) I'll plead if you make my sentence run concurrently, and
not consecutively. 32
(3) I'll plead if you strike my prior drunk driving conviction and
let me attend an alcoholic rehabilitation program instead of sus-
pending my driver's license. 33
(4) I'll plead if you agree that I stand convicted by my plea to
an offense that is neither presently charged against me nor even a
lesser included offense under the accusatory pleading.3 4
30. See supra note 8; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 11, 559 P.3d 1028, 1035, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409,
416-17. The defendant was charged with theft and perjury. The plea agreement in-
cluded only the prosecutor's promise to intervene in the department of corrections
factual study but not that he would argue any particular disposition of the case.
Kaanehe's counsel stated the bargain as follows:
[We have] the final understanding that at the time of the imposition of
judgment and sentence the people would give up their right to recom-
mend or argue disposition of the case, reserving however unto themselves
the right to call to the... Court's attention any factual inaccuracies... in
any reports or studies or presentence reports.
Id.
32. People v. Simpson, 90 Cal. App. 3d 919, 924, 154 Cal. Rptr. 249, 252 (1979).
Pursuant to the plea bargain in the action in question (number 63728), the appel-
lant entered a plea of guilty to second degree burglary with the understanding
that any sentence imposed "will run concurrent" with any sentence imposed for
probation violation in action number 62648. The court, having approved the plea
bargain, could not sentence appellant to a punishment more severe than that spec-
ified in the plea agreement and could not proceed other than as specified therein.
33. People v. Gallego, 90 Cal. 3d Supp. 21, 31, 153 Cal. Rptr. 415, 421 (1979). The
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied, resulting in a convic-
tion of drunk driving. The appellate court held the trial court had abused its dis-
cretion in denying the defendant the right to take part in an alcohol program in
lieu of defendant's drivers license being suspended as provided for in his plea
bargain.
34. In re Troglin, 51 Cal. App. 3d 434, 124 Cal. Rptr. 234, 237 (1975). A plea may
even be taken to an offense even though the court would be without jurisdiction to
convict the defendant of that offense. The Troglin court stated the rule as follows:
[U]pon a plea bargain's guilty plea a defendant, at his request or ac-
quiesence, may be convicted of a lesser included offense not charged, and
the statutory definition of which "does not logically compose a part of the
(5) I'll plead guilty if the court goes along with the prosecutor's
agreement with me not to "recommend or fight against" a com-
mitment to the California Youth Authority.35(6) I'll plead to one count if the court agrees to dismiss two
counts and further agrees in advance to follow the recommenda-
tion of the department of corrections after a referral for a ninety
day study under Penal Code section 1203.03.36
(7) I'll plead guilty to oral copulation .if you strike the allega-
tions that I did it by force, strike the allegation of my prior felony
conviction and dismiss fourteen other counts.3 7
(8) I'll plead out to assault with a deadly weapon if you dismiss
three other counts, strike the use of a weapon, agree that there
will be "no physical state prison" and further if you release me on
my own recognizance pending my report and sentence. 38
greater." This is even though the trial court would otherwise be without
jurisdiction to convict him of the offense.
Id. (quoting People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d at 612, 477 P.2d at 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 395.)
35. People v. Watts, 67 Cal. App. 3d 173, 183, 136 Cal. Rptr. 496, 503 (1977). The
Watts court noted that:
According to the declaration of Watts' trial counsel, the district attorney
indicated that although he would prefer to have Watts sent to prison he
would not 'recommend a fight' against a commitment to the California
Youth Authority on a sentence under the youthful offender provisions of
Penal Code Section 1202(b).
Id.
36. In People v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal. 3d 749, 756 n.4, 587 P.2d 220, 224 n.4, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 778, 782 n.4 (1978). Defendant was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to commit murder and possession of marijuana for sale. The
plea agreement stated defendant would plead guilty to the assault charge, the ma-
rijuana charge would be dismissed and he would be sentenced in accordance with
the department of corrections report, which report the judge agreed to follow. The
trial judge was quoted as stating his part of the agreement: "I have agreed, as has
your attorney, Mr. Kenner, that before I could send you to the State Prison, I
would have to get that 90-day diagnostic study and I would follow the recommen-
dation." Id.
Multiple counts are often dimissed as a part of the bargain. For example, 16 of
the 17 forgery counts were dismissed as part of the consideration in In re Troglin,
51 Cal. App. 3d 434, 437, 124 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1975).
37. People v. Collins, 21 Cal. 3d 208, 211, 577 P.2d 1026, 1027, 145 Cal. Rptr. 686,
687 (1978). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the defendant entered a plea of
guilty to one count of oral copulation. In return, all allegations of the commission
of that crime by means of force, and of a prior felony conviction were stricken.
The other 14 counts were also dismissed.
38. In People v. Morris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 358, 360 n.1, 158 Cal. Rptr. 722, 724 n.1
(1979), defense counsel stated the detailed bargain in the following language:
Mr. Roland (defense counsel): At this time, Your Honor, Mr. Morris
wishes to withdraw his previously entered plea of not guilty and, pursuant
to negotiations with the District Attorney and discussions with the Court,
to enter a plea of guilty of Count One and Two, each being a violation of
Section 245(a) of the Penal Code, assault with a deadly weapon, with the
understanding that Counts Three, Four, and Five would be dismissed, and
that the allegation of use under 12022.5 would be stricken. The District At-
torney has indicated that there will be no physical State Prison pursuant
to a negotiated plea, and the Court has indicated that it would release Mr.
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Present this random factual selection of commonplace bar-
gains 39 to any group of lay citizens concerned with the escalation
of crime in our society and ask if such bargains should be a part
of the criminal process involving judicial participation and the an-
swer will be no.
IV. WHY THE COURTS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE
The role of the court must be to stay out of the dispositional
process until the question of guilt has been resolved. Only when
guilt has been established by an unfettered plea, jury verdict, or
court decision on the facts of the cases should the judiciary em-
bark upon sentencing or other dispositional considerations. Ear-
lier dispositional ponderings involving "just societal result"
inevitably impose upon the court the non-judicial problems of the
advocate. The responsibilities of an advocate should remain to-
tally in the hands of the publicly elected prosecutor and defense
counsel. The latter is answerable only to his client within thecode of ethics controlling the relationship between them. The for-
mer, the publicly elected prosecutor, is ever answerable to his
constituency at election time and forced to realistically appraise
Morris today on his own recognizance pending report and sentence with a
condition, or at least a strong reminder, that there should be no violations
of the law between now and the report and sentence day.
Id. (emphasis added).
39. Other examples of the various forms of plea bargain agreements follow:
Defendant was charged with three counts of drug violations and one count of con-
spiracy. The plea agreement allowed the defendant to be placed on six years pro-
bation and serve three one-year terms, one of which was later reduced to nine
months. People v. Allen, 46 Cal. App. 3d 583, 586, 120 Cal. Rptr. 127, 128 (1975). De-
fendant pleaded guilty to second degree burglary pursuant to a plea bargain
where the People agreed not to oppose reduction of the charge to a misdemeanor
at the time of sentencing if defendant had no prior record. Because defendant had
a prior record, his probation was denied, the six month sentence was denied and
defendant was sentenced to prison. People v. Jackson, 103 Cal. App. 3d 635, 637, 163
Cal. Rptr. 115, 116 (1980). When defendant's motion to suppress marijuana evi-
dence was denied he withdrew his initial not guilty plea to the charge and pleaded
guilty. Part of the plea of guilt assured defendant of a certain court commissioner
for sentencing but that particular commissioner was appointed to a municipal
court and the newly appointed commissioner denied probation and sentenced de-
fendant to state prison. People v. Preciado, 78 Cal. App. 3d 144, 149, 144 Cal. Rptr.
102, 104 (1978). In People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d 666, 669-70, 631 P.2d 30, 31, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 597 (1981), defendant entered a plea whereby he plead guilty to violating
probation and endangering the health of a child in exchange for the court's prom-
ise not to make any findings as to certain probation violations, to order a diagnos-
tic study under CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.03, and to not sentence defendant to state
prison.
the strength of his cases before entering into a plea agreement, an
area touched upon in "The Awesome Responsibility." 40 It is time
to recognize the considerations faced daily by the district attor-
ney, and to view plea bargaining in its proper light. Properly
viewed, plea bargaining is "a process by which the People, repre-
sented by the prosecutor, and a defendant negotiate an agree-
ment for the disposition of criminal charges against the
defendant"41 without the participation of or ratification by a court
which can never be cognizant of all the militating considerations.
In reviewing the following partial list of some of the factors
taken into consideration by the defense counsel and prosecuting
attorney before engaging in plea bargaining, it will at once be
clear that the court is not in a position to participate in the pro-
cess.42 No court can participate in a meaningful way in knowing
and weighing the manifold combination of such trial considera-
tions as:
(1) The present criminal priority cases in the offices of the dis-
trict attorney, the public defender or other defense counsel.
(2) How the witnesses on both sides are evaluated and will hold
up or break down in the professional judgment of the trial
lawyers.
(3) The availability of witnesses on both sides.
(4) The goofs and gaps resultant from inadequate investigation
and assembling of the evidence.
(5) Pending charges in other jurisdictions.
(6) Parole and probation status of the accused.
(7) The geographical area of the jury selection in relation to the
crimes charged and its significance toward a conviction or an
acquittal.
(8) The considerations of the district attorney in rejecting statu-
tory diversion at the threshold under the sections following and in
Penal Code section 1000 or non-statutory diversion under local
district attorney policy.43
40. Ackley, The Awesome Responsibility, CAL. TRIAL LAw A.J., Summer 1970, at
17. The considerations made by the prosecutor in handling the case for the people
include 1) whether to prosecute for a felony or misdemeanor, 2) how much of the
limited time, budget and personnel to assign to the case, 3) whether to go forward,
based upon the evidence, or drop the charges 4) whether to negotiate a plea, and if
so, what terms to offer the defendant, and 5) the motive and personality of the ac-
cuser and accused involved in the alleged crime.
41. People v. Smith, 53 Cal. App. 3d 655, 658, 126 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197 (1975).
42. See supra note 40.
43. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1001.35 (West Supp. 1982). Before determin-
ing whether to even accept a plea bargain and proceeding to the the dispositional
phase of the entered plea, the district attorney must determine whether the de-
fendant is eligible for pre-trial diversion. Diversion allows the defendant to avoid
[Vol. 10: 39, 1982] Plea Bargaining
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
(9) Court availability problems other than in the trial court
where the charges under consideration have been filed, and calen-
dar commitments and staff distribution in those courts.
(10) The local and state law enforcement need in certain cases
not to have undercover agents exposed.
(11) Joint and several trial programs under People v. Aranda44
constraints.
(12) The uncertainty of the legal area involved.45
(13) The motives of the complaining witness for the
prosecution.
(14) The nature and basis of any community feeling with refer-
ence to the offense before the court.
(15) The status and condition of the victim involved in the al-
leged offense.
What prosecutor is going to advise the court with utmost candor
along these lines?
"Your Honor, I don't know whether we can get a conviction in this rape
case or not because I do not know if the jury will believe the prosecutrix.
The investigative work of the law enforcement agency involved is so poor
at certain points that it may not stand up in court. Besides, the defense
lawyer here is excellent and my best trial man has another case going.
For these reasons we ask the court to consider this lesser disposition."
Stated or not, such influences are active in the mind of any fore-
handed prosecutor along with myriad other considerations that
cannot and should not be recorded into the record but which are
everyday, valid, and practical factors which the state's attorney
weighs in deciding on the likelihood a conviction can be obtained
from a jury.
having to stand trial on alleged offenses, and instead, to enter some structured ed-
ucational or rehabilitation diversionary program. Eligibility for diversion is based
on several factors which are reviewable by the court. If the district attorney finds
that the factors used in determining eligibility for diversion weigh against granting
diversion the People would have a stronger basis to prosecute and provide greater
leverage in the plea bargaining negotiations. If the factors tend to support a find-
ing of eligibility and thus avoid sentencing the district attorney would be more
willing to bargain.
44. Various alternatives are possible when the district attorney desires to in-
troduce into evidence an extrajudicial statement of one defendant that implicates
a codefendant. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 530-31, 407 P.2d 265, 272, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 353, 360 (1965).
45. For example, the areas of utilization of the Red Light Abatement Law are
filled with such uncertainty. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11225 (West 1982). See also
Van de Kamp v. American Art Enterprises, Inc., 124 Cal. App. 3d 1023, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 776 (1981).
V. THE URGED CONCLUSIONS AND CLOSING COMMENTS
Participation by the courts in negotiations with the criminally
accused blurs, sometimes beyond recognition the prosecutorial
function and the impartial arbiter function of the judiciary in an
adversary process. Such participation erodes the concept of ob-
jective evaluation and independent consideration of just disposi-
tion after establishment of guilt. The encumbering costs in
making the judge an improper participant in the process before
guilt has been established are far too onerous for the tax-paying
citizenry to longer endure.
The overbroad and poorly-drafted Gann Initiative, labeled "The
Victims' Bill of Rights"46 is but a single indication reflective of
public understanding or misunderstanding and mistrust of the
plea bargaining system.47 This mistrust stems from the lack of ac-
46. Election Results, June 8, 1982, Prop. 8, §§ 1-10 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1164-69
(West) (amending CAL. CONST. art. I) (codified as amended in various sections of
CAL. PENAL CODE). The measure, inter alia, would admit all relevant evidence
without limit which would ostensibly include the products of coercion, torture,
bribery, fraud, and evidence obtained in violation of constitutional proscriptions
against unreasonable search and seizure. Additionally, the mandatory restitution
provision is totally without guidelines as to enforcement or criteris. How does a
pauper make restitution? What is the measure of restitution to a victim of a forci-
ble sexual attack? Are there surviving "victims" of violent crime in a case of mur-
der, and, if so, who are they and what is the amount of restitution to which they
are entitled?
Proposition 8 § 7, p. 1167-68 reads in pertinent part:
Limitation of Plea Bargaining. Section 1192 is added to the Penal Code,
to read:
1192.7 (a) Plea bargaining in any case in which the indictment or infor-
mation charges any serious felony or any offense of driving while under
the influence of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or any other intoxicating sub-
stance, or any combination thereof, is prohibited, unless there is insu.ffi-
cient evidence to prove the people's case, or testimony of a material
witness cannot be obtained, or reduction or dismissal would not result in
a substantial change in sentence.
(b) As used in this section "plea bargaining" means any bargaining, ne-
gotiation, or discussion between a criminal defendant, or his or her coun-
sel, and a prosecuting attorney or judge, whereby the defendant agrees to
plead guilty or nolo contendere, in exchange for any promises, commit-
ments, concessions, assurances, or consideration by the prosecuting attor-
ney or judge relating to any charge against the defendant or to the
sentencing of the defendant.
The actual impact upon the courts and the plea bargaining process is undetermi-
nable at this time because each individual section's constitutionality is still open
to challenge. Further, the vague language of § 7 which allows plea bargaining in
only limited situations gives no guidance as to what constitutes "insufficient evi-
dence" or any standard to determine whether a "reduction or dismissal would not
result in a substantial change in sentence." Id.
Also worthy of note are the defects implied in the initiative, which are brought
forth in the interview of Paul Gann in THE CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Sept. 1981, at 50-53.
47. Another example of the poor drafting of the initiative is found at 1192.7,
which was intended to limit plea bargaining; it in fact permits unlimited plea bar-
gaining by not including felonies at the complaint stage in the municipal court,
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countability to the public for accepted plea bargains, resultant
from the removal of the process from t he rqnnnihi1it.v,nf hh_ .. _
trict attor t us return to the fundamental concept that every prosecutor
every pr( should answer to the people for every charge filed and every plea
meted ou entered and that every judge should answer to the people for
plea or fi every sentence meted out or not meted out and every otherdisposition made after plea or finding of
The sekiau JWcit,- M Sa IUly
has been eroded by bringing plea bargaining into the judicial
area, and the criminal process has been demeaned by such an ex-
pansion.4 8 Let us again re-shoulder the independent responsibili-
ties of each elective office and return to the voting public the
ability to measure performance in the sacredness of the ballot
box.
since the draftsmen styled the limitation under section seven to apply only to an
"indictment or information."
48. People v. Orin, 13 Cal. 3d 937, 533 P.2d 193, 120 Cal. Rptr 65 (1975); see also
People v. Orin: Penal Code Section 1385 Dismissals and the Effectuation of Plea
Bargains, 6 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 249, 262 (1976).

